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                             Abstract 
   The issue discussed in this paper is the loss of meaning for the expression `intelligence'. 
The term taken from everyday language has been applied to various psychological definitions, 
theories or psychometric tests across a period of time which has contributed to the corrosion in 
meaning of the original term. Attempts by science to isolate and identify the qualities or attrib-
utes of intelligence have altered if not entirely destroyed the meaning of the expression. A brief 
review of the history of the modern investigation into intelligence is thereby presented. 
   Spearman as early as 1927 wrote that "in truth, ` intelligence' has become a mere vocal 
sound, a word with so many meanings that finally it has none' (p. 14). Sixty years later, Jensen 
(1987) repeated the same sentiment: "For scientific purposes, then, ` intelligence' can best be 
thrown out altogether" (p. 196). From the 14 experts who contributed their views on the nature 
of intelligence in an issue of the Journal of Educational Psychology in 1921, to a symposium of 
25 experts (Sternberg & Detterman, 1986), there seems to be almost as many conceptualisa-
tions and definitions of intelligence as there are experts to write them. All of this indicates that 
respected writers in psychology find it hard to agree on either a definition of intelligence or to 
what extent certain factors affect it. This paper explores the issue and problems of measure-
ment bound up in the confusion around defining the concept of intelligence. Discussion and sug-
gestions as to how language usage around the concept might be more articulate is offered.
   Respected writers in psychology fin 
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gence' has become a mere vocal sound, a word with so many meanings that finally it has none' 
(p. 14). Sixty years later, Jensen (1987) repeated the same sentiment: "For scientific pur-
poses, then, ` intelligence' can best be thrown out altogether" (p. 196). From the 14 experts 
who contributed their views on the nature of intelligence in an issue of the Journal of Educational 
Psychology in 1921, to a symposium of 25 experts (Sternberg & Detterman, 1986), there seems 
to be almost as many conceptualisations and definitions of intelligence as there are experts to 
write them. Sternberg himself (1999) makes an attempt at definition by stating, "intelligence 
may be defined as the ability to adapt to, shape, and select environments", but this simple state-
ment leaves the issue of measurement in dispute. 
   Nowhere are the differences in opinion on intelligence more graphically illustrated than in 
Eysenck and Kamin (1981). Each states his position regarding their ideas relating to intelli-
gence and a variety of related issues individually and then replies to, and critically comments 
upon, the other's work. The items addressed include the concept of intelligence itself, IQ tests, 
the relevance of biological or environmental factors and cultural issues. In his "Rejoinder to Ey-
senck" Kamin is adversarial in his style almost to the extent of personal insult. [Kamin fails, 
however, to offer convincing opposing arguments. I Such differences of opinion are illustrative 
of the strength of feeling such issues are capable of arousing. Other writers in the field show a 
similar lack of agreement on the subject, including that of definition. 
   Horn, (Ackerman, et al. , 1988) states that intelligence is a synonym for cognitive abilities. 
Fontana (1988) echoes and amplifies this idea by stating that ". . . we define intelligence as the 
ability to see relationships and to use this ability to solve problems. " Both the ideas of Horn and 
Fontana tie together in the notion that whatever intelligence is, it is delineated by ability. Bigge 
(1976) takes this idea further. He again uses the idea of ability but is specific about those that 
define intelligence. For Bigge, intelligence is an individual's ability to respond to a given situa-
tion by anticipating the possible consequences of his actions. 
   While there is a clear relationship between the definitions offered by Horn, Fontana, and 
Bigge, the definition of the latter is more informative in that it provides examples of what 
represents intelligent behaviour. Bigge describes a man trying to lift a log from among a pile of 
other logs. The man straddles the log and attempts to move it. Bigge argues that if in doing so 
he dislodges other logs and they cause him to be lifted in the air by a fulcrum effect and left dan-
gling, then his lack of foresight, judgement and awareness how him to be unintelligent in those 
actions. Successful extraction of the log would, however, be representative of intelligent behav-
iour. 
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   Miles (1957) advocates a similar approach to seeking an understanding of intelligence. 
Rather than defining intelligence in some manner, he suggests that the term ` intelligence' be 
replaced by ` intelligent behaviour.' His reasons for doing this are given as a desire to eliminate 
popular misconceptions of what intelligence is [i. e. something we possess as a finite quantity 
and probably located in the head. I The fact that intelligence has grown in popular conception to 
mean something akin to a personal quality or a personality characteristic also concerned Ey-
senck (1978; Eysenck & Kamin, 1981). In both works he speaks of the idea of intelligence as 
held by "the man in the street. " These ideas, he states, are somewhat different from those held 
by psychologists. However, it could be argued that in using only behaviour as a guide to intelli-
gence, Bigge and Miles are falling into a similar trap as Eysenck's ` man in the street.' Ad-
ditonally with situational definitions there is the problem of consistency of evaluation. If sub-
jects under observation fail in one context but suceed in another, how are they to be described; 
as intelligent in one case but not in another? 
   By concentrating on behaviour, other important issues are ignored. Why did not the unfor-
tunate log mover anticipate the movement of the logs? It may be the case that he had no prior 
experience in similar situations. Bigge may have carried off his argument that the man was 
"unintelligent" had he stated that the man had worked in this field for some time. To repeat er-
rors that he could have foreseen due to his experience would have been evidence that he had not 
assimilated prior experience, or had not recalled that past experience, or related that experience 
to his current situation. The argument here is behaviour alone is not sufficient evidence of intel-
ligence, and to base an evaluation of an individual on that alone would be flawed. Furthermore 
this argument suggests aspects of intelligence which are assumed to support the quality: 1) 
learning from prior experience, 2) good or excellent memory, and 3) abstract conceptualisation 
of experience which serves to inform new or related experience through appropriate associa-
tion. 
   Howe (1990) expresses a similar argument in a paper that questioned the very existence of 
intelligence. He warned against using the term "intelligence" as both a descriptor and a 
definer. To do so he argues is "linguistic sleight of hand" and constitutes a fallacy causing the 
ideas of intelligence to become a circular argument. This is qualified in the example of a state-
ment such as "My factory produces more goods because it is more productive. " This statement 
is not an explanation, Howe asserts, it simply restates the initial clause. This is further evidence 
against the value of Bigge or Miles drawing conclusions about intelligence from behaviour. To 
state that someone does X because he or she is intelligent (or not) is similarly circular to the 
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statement above on factory production. 
   This may appear to be something of a semantic argument, but it is illustrative of the 
problems faced in reaching a definition of intelligence. It must be decided whether intelligence 
is what causes performance in a certain manner, or if it is a quantifiable quality for which norms 
can be established - one which can be used to evaluate performance - as with psychometric tests. 
The basic problem with the behaviourist definition above is that Bigge and Miles are merely ap-
plying the latter option. The problem with any definition of intelligence relying on outcomes 
such as behaviour or performance is the danger of confusing intelligence with other constructs 
which are more clearly defined, such as attainment. Attainment is defined as a measure of what 
an individual is capable of due to his experience, training, or learning.
                   Psychometric Issues and Problems 
   A major problem in the psychometric field of intelligence is deciding what qualities the 
term intelligence relates to and whether it is a causal factor or a quantifiable outcome. The 
difficulty in quantifying the constructs involved is in clearly specifying that which is to be meas-
ured. On the other hand, if intelligence is the causal element behind behaviour, it implies that it 
is some kind of capacity, or even ` mental power' (Gillham, 1975). 
   Additionally, Snow and Guilford (1982 - in Wagner and Sternberg, 1984) suggest intelli-
gence can be divided into individual `constructs' (Snow) or specific factors (Guilford). Guil-
ford postulates uch factors may total as many as 150. In Eysenck (1983), Guilford is quoted as 
having identified only 120 `factors' with evidence to directly support 80 of them. Eysenck calls 
these claims `absurd' and states that most ` factors' are merely facets of other more basic types 
of intelligence (A, B, C described below) and are all linked in some way. He feels the claims are 
ridiculous because he adheres to Spearman's `g' theory. 
   Wechsler (as cited in Gillham, 1975) compared what he called general intelligence to elec-
tricity, a kind of energy. Gillham asserts that this is a suitable analogy as we do not know what 
electricity is either ! (This is, of course, untrue. ) Spearman (1927, in Wagner and Sternberg, 
1984), also spoke of general intelligence. Spearman said that intelligence came in two forms, 
general intelligence and specific intelligence. All performance or activity contains a factor of 
general intelligence and a factor of specific intelligence. He called the general intelligence fac-
tor (g) and the specific factor (s). What specific factors are at work at any one time depends 
upon what task is being performed. 
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   It will prove informative and useful to take the time to expand Wechsler's analogy, and 
model of intelligence in the electrical world. Any system, electrical or mechanical, may be 
modelled against three basic factors. These are called the prime mover, an effect, and the opposi-
tion to that effect. In electricity, the prime mover is voltage, often called electromotive force or 
electrical potential. The effect is the resultant current in the form of a movement of free charge 
carriers (electrons). The opposition to that effect is resistance. How then may Wechsler's 
analogy be expanded? One aspect of cognitive functioning could be equated to voltage suggest-
ing a motive force to intelligence which might take the name Cognito Motive Force (CMF). In 
this case the second part of the analogy relates to the goodness of the conducting material ex-
pressed in electrical terms as resistance. Currently, measurement of cognitive capability is cen-
tred on the outcomes of the process which in the analogy would be equivalent o measuring elec-
trical current. However, the amount of current has a relationship not only to the motive force, 
but also to the ability or nature of the conducting material transmitting the current. Under con-
sideration here are the physiological differences in synaptic connections or some other psycho-
physiological aspect of cognition. 
   The notion of intelligence being related to physiological qualities is not new. Hebb (1949) 
introduced a model of intelligence that has proved useful and has been accepted by other psy-
chologists (Vernon, 1972; Eysenck, 1983). In his model Hebb distinguished between what he 
called intelligence A and intelligence B. Intelligence A is representative of innate abilities. It is 
derived from a biological basis. Intelligence A with its biological/physiological basis must, by 
implication, be effected by genetic factors and be responsible, at least in part, for the individual 
differences in intelligence between people (Eysenck, 1983). 
   Intelligence B on the other hand, although inevitably built upon the foundations of intelli-
gence A, is developed through an individual's interaction with his/her environment. The major 
problem here is evaluating an individual's overall intelligence if this arrangement of compo-
nents of intelligence is accepted. How much of the differences between individuals is due to the 
presence, or lack of, innate ability? Or, how much of individual differences is due to the richness 
or poverty of that individual's life experience? This problem is indicative of one of the most fun-
damental arguments within psychological perspectives on intelligence, and broadly defines the 
diametric differences mentioned between Eysenck and Kamin (1981) in the introduction. It is 
also the basis for criticism of Bigge's evaluation of his log-lifting friend. 
   The writings of Eysenck are broadly representative of one school of thought suggesting 
that intelligence is ultimately biologically or genetically based, and that genetic factors tend to 
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be of greater significance than environmental factors. Kamin on the other hand is representa-
tive of the opposing school of thought which suggests intelligence is influenced to a much great-
er degree by environment han genetic or physiological make-up. This is of course a simplifica-
tion of the arguments on both sides, but provides a summary to illustrate the point. 
   The direct measurability of either intelligence A or B remains, even to date, a problem. 
Relatively little is truly known about the relationship between cognitive functioning and the 
brain, although much of the more scientific work in psychology is now taking place in this area. 
The work of Cattell, Hendrickson & Hendrickson, Berger, Jensen, and Sternberg (Eysenck, 
1982) investigates the possibilities of identifying physiological/neurological spects that direct-
ly correlate with IQ. Nonetheless, it is not possible to place a meter across the brain and meas-
ure directly the ` goodness' of the quantity between the ears. It follows then, that if intelligence 
A can not be quantified then measuring its influence is even less likely. 
   Vernon (1960) also addressed this problem. He introduced intelligence C to describe the 
sampling of intelligence B by standardised (IQ) tests. We must note that within this concept 
we are not measuring intelligence B, we are sampling it. This distinction is both necessary and 
informative. One concern about intelligence testing (particularly for the ` man in the street') is 
that IQ tests purport to measure innate (and therefore finite and unalterable) abilities. Within 
the concept of intelligence C it is possible to encompass both schools of thought mentioned 
above and produce meaningful quantification of an aspect of intelligence. What is still unclear is 
the extent to which intelligence A or B is the primary factor effecting intelligence C. Indeed this 
is a return to the debate outlined above. The link between A and C is clear all the same. Intelli-
gence B has a function of A in its make-up. Intelligence C is a quantity obtained by sampling B. 
This theory is further legitimised if physiological processing models such as those proposed by 
the Hendricksons, Jensen and Sternberg (all in Eysenck, 1982) are considered. 
   It is worth noting the above analogy of intelligence to electricity by Wechsler proved some-
what inspired. The work of Hebb in particular (1949, 1972) integrated the separate disciplines 
of neurology and psychology. He postulated models of brain function and the significance of 
synaptic/neuron action in learning. These models have been accepted in the artificial intelli-
gence (AI) world as the basis for modelling silicon based (MOS) learning devices such as neu-
ral networks. While we do not have a so called `Ohm's Law of Intelligence', there is an expres-
sion referred to as the 'Hebbian Learning Law' which is being used to build artificial synaptic 
circuits (Card & Moore, 1993) !
   The expansion of Wechsler's analogy illustrates 1) the complexity of constructing a defini-
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tion of intelligence and 2) the differences between some current definitions. Consider Horn's 
(in Ackerman et al, 1989) statement that intelligence is synonymous with cognitive functioning. 
Our model was constructed from Wechsler's analogy that intelligence was the force behind cog-
nitive functioning. The two definitions are somewhat at variance with each other. The ap-
proaches of Guilford and Spearman seem to suggest hat intelligence may be defined by the fac-
tors effecting functioning. Indeed, Spearman's (g) could relate to CMF, and there could be 
some of (s) in intelligence B. This is simply further evidence and elucidation of the situation 
outlined in the first section of this paper which says psychologists find it difficult to agree on a 
definition. 
   Eysenck states, 
          Questions of a definition usually worry the scientist much less than the interested 
      layman; the former realises as the latter does not that a proper definition comes at the 
      end, not at the beginning of the quest. 
          The man in the street, and often the unwary psychologist oo, thinks of intelli-
      gence as something really existing `out there'; something the psychologist may or may 
       not recognise successfully or measure with more or less success.... Such reification is 
      utterly mistaken; there is nothing `out there' which could be called intelligence, just as 
      there is nothing out there that could be called gravitation (1978). 
The point is that intelligence is a concept often used in a descriptive fashion, just as concepts to 
model the world around us are used. As long as those concepts continue to provide accurate 
predictions or withstand rigorous empirical investigation there is no reason to dispense with 
them. As Howe (1990) points out, the use of the concept of intelligence is fine as long as no one 
believes that in describing one's performance, reasons have been provided for it. 
   Binet, considered the grandfather of intelligence tests, adopted a relatively broad opera-
tional definition of intelligence as shown in the wide variety of tasks which are used to assess in-
telligence on some of the first tests developed (Binet & Simon, 1905, 1911; Gould, 1981). 
Wechsler (1939) clearly influenced by Binet's approach, defined intelligence as "the aggregate 
or global capacity of the individual to act purposefully, to think rationally and to deal effectively 
with his environment" (ibid. , p. 3). In the same text he also stated "One of the greatest contri-
butions of Binet was his intuitive assumption that, in the selection of tests, it made little differ-
ence what sort of tasks you used, provided that in some way it was a measure of the child's 
general intelligence" (ibid. , p. 6). Initially, Wechsler's belief that intelligence is more than the 
sum of intellectual abilities led him to include some sub-tests that are not good measures of (g)
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in his widely used intelligence batteries. Wechsler's method of obtaining IQ's from a diverse 
collection of tasks, some of which have low g-loadings, has been used in many individually ad-
ministered mental ability tests and has become almost the accepted way of estimating intelli-
gence. 
   The British Abilities Scales which is presently used in England as the accepted educational 
standard for measurement of intelligence broadly defines intelligence based on Spearman's (g) 
as being, "the general ability of an individual to perform complex mental processing that in-
volves conceptualisation and the transformation of information" (Elliott, 1997). But Elliott in-
sists that only sub-tests are used in the battery that have high statistical g loadings on the cen-
tral composite score (called General Conceptual Ability, the GCA). So contemporary thought 
operationally defines intelligence as the composite score (now called psychometric g) produced 
from sub-tests and scales which evaluate skill in various areas assumed to relate to intelligence 
because of their mathematical correlation to clusters of factors produced statistically on these 
sub-tests. Elliott (1997) defines GCA as "the first component in a principal-component analy-
sis, the first factor in a common-factor analysis, or the most general factor in a hierarchical-fac-
tor analysis" (ibid. , p. 16). This is a definition which he says came from Jensen (1979, 1987), 
and is to be used in place of the more general concept of "`intelligence' which may convey a var-
iety of meanings" (ibid. , p. 16). But historically, in fact, the most influential individual in de-
veloping this statistical approach to defining intelligence with testing, factoring and correlation 
of components of sub-tests has been Spearman.
                   The Measurement of Intelligence 
   The statement "intelligence is what intelligence tests measure" (Boring, 1950) has been 
repeated on several occasions. (Gleitman, 1986; Eysenck, 1986). This is a fairly tongue in 
cheek observation, but it is a statement hat Eysenck contends is not so circular as it may seem. 
It is simply an operational definition of intelligence, similar to the statement hat heat is what 
thermometers measure. The complication in the case of intelligence is that there are several 
related terms used in related contexts that overlap (as indicated earlier) which require clarifica-
tion of meaning. It would also be possible to argue that each of the items discussed below are 
what intelligence (IQ) tests measure to varying degrees. The reason why there is an almost 
compulsive need to quantify intelligence in some way is beyond the scope of this paper. What is 
briefly covered next are some of the issues and problems relevant to intelligence measurement. 
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   First, the term attainment (often the term ` achievement' is used in an identical manner) 
may appear confusingly similar to what is measured in an intelligence test. According to Gleit-
man (1986), attainment is a measure of what an individual can do at the time of testing. On the 
other hand, it is a popular belief that aptitude is what such tests measure. Gleitman also defines 
aptitude; "tests of aptitude. . predict what an individual may be able to do later given the ap-
propriate training and motivation" (ibid. , p. 39). Eysenck (1978, 1986) defines another 
property often attributed to IQ tests, i. e. , measurement of what the layman would identify as 
general cleverness, a problem solving ability that can be applied to all situations or disciplines. 
(This kind of general cognitive skill is exactly what Cicero was referring to in his term ` intel-
ligentsia' and thus giving birth to the idea of what is now called intelligence. ) This is subtly 
different from aptitude as aptitude is regarded as being specific to a skill area as in engineering 
aptitude, or music aptitude. 
   The question arising from these points is still, what do IQ tests measure? To suppose they 
are measuring `basal ability' in general would go against the point previously made that intelli-
gence A is not directly accessible since physiological/biological factors seem to be mostly 
responsible for this attribute. To suggest hat IQ tests are purely a measure of future success is 
also equally flawed. Indeed, much of the opprobrium related to IQ testing has risen from the 
misconception that such tests were supposed to give such information, and have been found to 
be inappropriate. An often cited example of this, and probably one of the primary causes of ` the 
man in the street's' reservations about IQ testing, was the "11+" examination used in England. 
The 11+ examination was a procedure designed to predict future performance (attainment) on 
the basis of current performance (aptitude) ; although, the relationship between these attributes 
is tenuous at best, in spite of the link at a basal level with intelligence A. 
   Ultimately the 11+ was not an intelligence test at all. It was a test of English ability, 
mathematics, and verbal reasoning. In his explanation of the failure of the 11+ examination to 
correlate to a higher degree with future academic success, Eysenck (Eysenck & Kamin, 1981) 
used Cattell's term ` crystallised ability' (CA, which was defined as knowledge gained through 
experience and exposure to the educational environment, and internalised into meaningful 
schemata). Again, this term by definition is synonymous with attainment. Fluid ability (FA) is 
that innate `cleverness' as expressed above, similar to Spearman's (g). Eysenck asserted that 
there was no test of fluid ability at all in the 11+ !The distinction between CA and FA should be 
emphasised here. This model of intelligence which takes into account life experience in fluid in-
telligence is a measure of cognitive power that can be brought to bare on a set of problems out-
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side previous experience. The implications of this are not often explicitly expressed but are, in 
fact, that fluid ability probably has a strong basis in genetic/physiological factors and is possibly 
a fixed quantity from birth - a frightening and probably unpopular view to take. 
   Certainly many of the tests used in industry and education today are not truly intelligence 
tests as they only measure aptitude or attainment. They seem to gain the term ` intelligence 
test' by malapropism. There is however a recent movement in the business community to em-
ploy psychometric testing of a more appropriate nature in a rapidly increasing use of occupa-
tional assessment in evaluating employees for selection for everything from original employ-
ment, in-house training programs to promotion (Miller, 1996). The general view now is that 
the predictive validity of ability tests (or GMA tests) is stronger than that of intelligence testing 
in terms of future performance, and consequently a more reliable approach to the kind of infor-
mation sought (Schmidt & Hunter, 1998). 
   In conclusion, it seems it must be realised only limited information relating to intelligence 
can be gained with the use of IQ tests. The concept of intelligence C seems most useful in this 
respect. The results of such tests are in some manner indicative of the innate, fluid ability of in-
telligence A. They are also measures of intelligence B, where attainment (or achievement) 
becomes an appropriately related function and environmental issues become of much greater 
importance than innate ability. This will be qualified as factors effecting intelligence are dis-
cussed shortly; however, the use of such IQ results as predictors of future achievement, par-
ticularly academic development, show a very uneven relationship (Eysenck & Kamin, 1981). It 
is clear that all tests need to be designed with care and their results judged with the limitations 
of testing firmly in mind, but if this is done, such testing can in a limited sense be a useful tool. 
   The standardisation of such tests gives us a yardstick against which the progress of individ-
uals in relationship to a theoretical norm can be measured. Psychometric tests are most useful 
as diagnostic tools to assist when things are not going as expected, rather than as a divisive 
means of judging an individual's quality. After all, Binet, the man who pioneered such testing 
intended his work to be used in this manner (Vernon, 1960). Wechsler's definition, and Binet's 
approach to putting very diverse tasks in the measure of intelligence, were the foundation of 
present day tests. This approach has been somewhat modified with the work of Spearman. 
Publication of his two major texts in 1923 and 1927 has had a major and continuing influence on 
the field. Central to his concept of the nature of intelligence are two aspects of performance -
the eduction of relations and the eduction of correlates. These are complex mental functions 
and are typified by tests of analogies, similarities and matrices. Such tests are recognised to be 
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good measures of both fluid intelligence and overall (g). Spearman (1927) also held to a doc-
trine he called the ` indifference of the indicator' that he applied to the development of tests of 
the general factor (g). This doctrine held that it made no difference what cognitive tests are in-
cluded in a battery provided all the tests are good measures of (g). It is this last clause that dis-
tinguishes Spearman, Wechsler, and the more recent British Abilities Scales which takes into 
consideration as its main organising principle the loadings of various tasks on the central com-
posite score - General Conceptual Ability - which is the equivalent o Spearman's general factor 
(g), also commonly called psychometric g (Elliott, 1997).
           Factors Effecting Intelligence & Artificial Intelligence 
   One of the greatest arguments in the field of intelligence has been the question of which fac-
tor - nature or nurture - has the greatest influence on intelligence. Since the work of Galton 
(Gleitman, 1986; Eysenck, 1982, 1983; Sternberg, 1982) the heritability of intelligence has been 
strongly debated. 
   The issues are clear in this area. If intelligence is hereditary, then its basis must be biologi-
cal/genetic. In a modern metaphor, intelligence is `hardware' related. The implication of this 
needs careful evaluation. It seems to be that those such as Kamin (Eysenck & Kamin, 1981) 
who most strongly contest the evidence, fear the proof of heritability. Their fear seems to be 
based on the notion that if intelligence is proven to be predominantly genetic, individuals may 
be judged to be of poor base quality material, and written off early in their academic areers. In 
their defence, such fears are not completely groundless (Gould, 1981) . After all in Britain, the 
11+ system was perceived by many as operating in just such a manner. The Americans had 
Goddard (1913, 1917), Terman (1916), and Yerkes (1921) who all helped prepare the way for 
passage of the Immigration Restriction Act of 1924 with its restrictions on immigration to the 
U. S. based on "the blight of poor genes" and its resultant lower IQ levels. 
   Nevertheless, denying the biological basis of intelligence is not the way to combat such atti-
tudes. If the proof of genetic/biological factors being as much as 80% responsible is to be ac-
cepted (Jensen, 1979; Sternberg, 1982; Eysenck, 1983), careful counsel is needed for those 
who may misinterpret such data as meaning certain individuals inherit academic hopelessness. 
   On the other hand, quoted in Sternberg (1982), Kamin (in 1974) asserts that none of intelli-
gence is inherited. There is no data sufficient to reject that the differences [in people] are de-
termined by their palpably differing life experience. Such views are rejected by Sternberg, with 
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supporting quotes from other critics and commentators. The fact that any thinking psy-
chologist can totally dismiss heredity as a factor in intelligence seems incredible. To deny such 
factors seems to fly in the face of Darwinian theories of evolution. There is also a large amount 
of evidence supporting heritability. It is right to continue to question such matters as the degree 
of heritability, but to deny it altogether is nonsense. See Vernon (1960), Hebb (1972), Stern-
berg (1982, 1984), and Eysenck (1983) for studies and reviews of the theory of heritability and a 
general concurrence on the matter. 
   None of the studies mentioned deny the importance of a `quality environment' to develop 
the potential of inherited abilities, what has been previously called intelligence A. As Hebb 
(1972) points out, the IQ of a child that has inherited `a good brain' but has suffered in a poor en-
vironment may be no better than a child who has less innate capacity and the advantage of a rich 
environment. These contradictory issues are of the sort that Kamin (Eysenck & Kamin, 1981) 
must be referring to in his arguments against heredity of intelligence. This is not so confusing if 
it is realised that Hebb was talking about the IQ measurement of individuals. It has already 
been established that IQ is a measure of intelligence C, which is in turn a sampling of intelli-
gence B, that is in turn only built upon intelligence A. Terminology is important as much of the 
argument and confusion in the area is semantic. 
   Until now, it has been maintained that intelligence A is not directly accessible to measure-
ment. That may no longer be strictly true. Several psychologists have been experimenting with 
electroencephalogram (EEG) machines and the correlation of their EEG research test results 
compare favourably to IQ style tests designed to measure fluid ability. Succard and Horn (in a 
paper reproduced in Eysenck, 1978) tested 108 individuals with an extensive IQ style test 
designed to measure fluid abilities. They followed these tests up with EEG tests. They were 
looking at what we call Average Evoked Potentials (AEPs) with the EEG. An AEP is a meas-
urable electrical response in the brain to a given sudden stimulus. That stimulus can be either 
auditory or visual. In general, an AEP response looks almost sinusoidal in nature. The 
response builds quickly over the first two cycles and then decays. The amplitude and latency of 
the electrical brain response in the study as recorded by the EEG were then statistically com-
pared to the IQ scores. As expected, the correlations were ` in the predicted direction;' the larg-
er amplitude AEPs correlated positively with IQ score, and AEP duration correlated negatively 
with IQ scores. In other words, ` bright' subjects had higher AEP amplitudes and shorter laten-
cies. The significance of such results is obvious. Cattell (reported in Eysenck, 1978) suggested 
that such responses are connected to the brain's reference and analytical mechanisms and the 
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establishment of memory engrams. As such, AEPs may be a measure of how well a subject 
remembers, processes, and/or evaluates information. 
   In a comprehensive review of Response Time (RT) research, Jensen and Sternberg (1982) 
concluded that RT also correlated with IQ in certain instances. The most meaningful results 
are from tests that give a problem that requires a simple response to a simple stimulus. More 
complicated studies confound the results with additional variables, but it is clear that chemical 
reactions in the body also influence the results. This all means that not only is cognitive fun-
ctioning related to genetics but also internal chemical activity ! The work of the Hendricksons 
provides a host of information on the central nervous system reactions in information process-
ing. The physiological/electrical processes are complex, but in essence, Hendrickson and 
Hendrickson (1982) outline the processes of signal transmission, information processing by 
neuron centers and the architecture of the synapse systems. This seems an area from which 
great contributions can be made in the direction of understanding intelligence physiologically 
and empirically.
                  The Scientific Basis of Intelligence 
   Presently, the most challenging questions in the area of intelligence are in the area of in-
dividual differences. Why are some people capable of extraordinary feats of cognitive-based 
skill at one end of the spectrum and others challenged by the functions of everyday living? If the 
evidence for heritability referred to above is accepted, the answer must lay in the difference be-
tween the equipment hat individuals receive at birth. Still there are other variables as ex-
plained above such as environmental and personality matters that cloud the issue. Real solu-
tions and the key to understanding the basis of intelligence (intelligence A in particular) rests 
with detailed knowledge of brain structure and cognitive functions. The brain after all, must be 
the seat of intelligence. 
   The most basic description of the brain is that of a tube with distended shapes at the end. 
These swellings form the cerebral hemispheres, the limbic system and component parts of the 
brain stem. These parts, the spinal cord and associated nerve connections form the central ner-
vous system (CNS). Hebb (1972) presents a basic information processing model in which in-
formation is received via receptors, transmitted through afferent and internuncial pathways to 
the brain stem and cerebrum. These pathways to the brain stem and cerebrum are ` hard wired.' 
The component parts of the brain stem/cerebrum then act on the stimulus in a manner yet to be 
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discussed. An `output' is then produced that is transmitted via hard wired efferent pathways to 
the body's effectors. The processing that takes place in the brain is another matter. 
   A neuron is a single nerve cell. They come in slightly differing varieties. Each neuron has 
a number of fibrils extending from it. Some are responsible for receiving impulses-the den-
drites. These impulses are of course chemical/electrical in nature. Each neuron connects via 
its dendrites and axon (an output fibril) to a massive network in the brain. The point at which 
an axon makes contact with a dendrite or cell body is called a synapse. The synapse can be con-
sidered as a nodal point where several dendrites make contact with an axon. These synaptic 
junctions are considered to be the seat of learning (Elliott, 1970; Hebb, 1972; Vander et al, 
1990; Ogmen and Moussa, 1993; Card and Moore, 1993). When a stimulus is repeated, a sticky 
substance called myelin begins to coat these synaptic junctions building up stronger connec-
tions and reinforcing the pathway of the stimulus. Habitual behaviour and response can be 
directly related to this process. See E. Roy John (1967, 1986) for greater biological and physio-
logical detail. 
   In the work of Suchard and Horn (in Eysenck, 1978) mentioned above, we saw how AEPs 
correlated with intelligence. We also know that electrical activity is the business of neurons and 
synapses. The work of Jensen and Sternberg (1982) outlined above related response time to in-
telligence. Jensen in another work (1979), postulated that hold ups at the synapses may be 
responsible for decreasing the frequency of AEP responses due to inhibited neuron firing and 
subsequently slowing down response time. The basis of intelligence then may lay with the qual-
ity of synaptic junctions, or neuron capability to effectively pass electrical stimuli! There must 
be of course some chemical elements linked to such processes. However, the capability of a 
neuron to generate an output would fit nicely in a further expansion of Wechsler's analogy be-
tween intelligence and electricity; and further, the idea of an "Ohm's Law of Intelligence" as 
postulated above. What this work still does not answer is the question of nature versus nurture. 
Although it would seem to make the question of heredity undeniable, it does not answer the 
question of environmental factors. How important are factors such as diet in the formative 
periods both before and after birth? Anyone who has worked with children in extreme poverty 
has no doubt.
                    Summary and Conclusion 
Initially this paper made an attempt to describe the problems that beset an indivi 
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tempting to define intelligence in a psychological sense. Many authors refer to intelligence in 
subtly differing ways. There are a variety of terms available to use, such as the terms crystal-
lised and fluid abilities, general intelligence (g), and specific intelligence (s) relating to specific 
tasks. In addition to this, the terms intelligence A, B, C, and psychometric (g) have been dis-
cussed. Each of these relating to innate ability (A), the development of that ability as facilitat-
ed by an individual's environment (B), and the measurable facet of those quantities (C). Some 
problems in measuring intelligence and the relevance of some specific factors relating to the 
possible basis of intelligence were discussed. Finally the paper addressed some of the issues 
current in the research of the ` hardware' systems that componentially form an intelligent being. 
   Whatever was achieved here is only a drop in the sea when it comes to describing the im-
mense field of the psychological perspective on intelligence. The most valuable lesson to be 
learned is that in spite of all the research available, the terminology defined or the models ex-
plored, we must be aware that there is much more to learn. The field is at a threshold of fuller 
scientific understanding of the neuro - physiological basis of the brain/mind and its attributes.
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